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SUPERIORITY AS UNITY
Jay Tidmarsh
ABSTRACT—One of Professor Redish’s many important contributions to
legal scholarship is his recent work on class actions. Grounding his
argument in the theory of democratic accountability that has been at the
centerpiece of all his work, Professor Redish suggests that, in nearly all
instances, class actions violate the individual autonomy of litigants and
should not be used by courts. This Essay begins from the opposite premise:
that class actions should be grounded in the notion of social utility rather
than autonomy so that class actions should be used whenever they achieve
net social gains. This idea of “superiority” presents some difficulties, not
the least of which is the capacity of a court to determine whether a class
action is indeed superior to other forms of dispute resolution. The Essay
proposes a series of presumptions that give effect to superiority and make
an inquiry into superiority easier for courts to conduct. When the results
obtained by these presumptions are examined, they do not result in the
near-absolute position against class actions that Professor Redish favors,
but surprising convergences in the autonomy and utility approaches
emerge.
AUTHOR—Diane and M.O. Miller, II Research Professor of Law, Notre
Dame Law School. I thank the participants in the Festschrift for Professor
Redish and the participants in a faculty colloquium at Notre Dame Law
School for comments on early versions of the ideas presented in this Essay.
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INTRODUCTION
Marty Redish’s book, Wholesale Justice,1 is the Cassandra of class
action literature. Its prophetic call for a significant scaling back of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and comparable state court counterparts2 has not
(or at least not yet) caught on among the commentators on class actions.
Even though the Supreme Court has also signaled in recent years its
discomfort with adventuresome uses of litigation, settlement, or arbitral
class actions,3 it has so far failed to heed Professor Redish’s arguments
about why class actions should be narrowly constrained.4
In this Essay, I engage Professor Redish’s arguments in detail. I have
great sympathy with the core of Professor Redish’s concern: that class
actions in many circumstances undermine democratic accountability
because they undercut the autonomy of individual litigants. I also admire
the Redishian sophistication in the book’s central move, which argues that
litigant autonomy is protected under the Due Process Clause.5 This move
allows Professor Redish to assert that the government can impinge on this
autonomy only when a compelling interest exists and that, except in a

1

MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
(2009).
2
For a compendium of state court class action rules or statutes, see ABA CLASS ACTIONS &
DERIVATIVE SUITS COMM., THE LAW OF CLASS ACTION: FIFTY-STATE SURVEY 2011–2012 (Elizabeth
J. Cabraser et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter THE LAW OF CLASS ACTION].
3
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (litigation class action); Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (arbitral class action); Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (settlement class action); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591
(1997) (settlement class action).
4
Among these arguments is the claim, see REDISH, supra note 1, at 16–17, 27, 169, that Rule 23
exceeds the delegation of authority given to the Supreme Court in the Rules Enabling Act to promulgate
“general rules of practice and procedure,” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006), but only when those rules do
“not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” id. § 2072(b). The Supreme Court has recently
rejected that argument, at least on the broad plain on which Professor Redish pitched it. See Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442–48 (2010) (plurality
opinion); id. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring).
5
To an extent, Professor Redish also grounds the right of litigant autonomy in the First
Amendment right of association—or, in the case of class actions, the right of nonassociation.
THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT
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narrow range of cases, American class action rules fail to meet this
stringent standard.6
The difficulty with the argument, as Professor Redish acknowledges
with his characteristic honesty,7 is that the Due Process Clause has not been
construed to protect litigant autonomy against government interference in
such a strong form. Indeed, the dominant approach to due process analysis
allows a court to trade off losses in litigant control against social gains (in
particular, reductions in the expense of litigation) achieved from less
adversarial processes.8 Using such a metric, it might seem obvious that
class actions both are constitutional and should be widely available, at least
as long as the efficiencies realized by class treatment exceed the intangible
loss of autonomy.
In fact, that conclusion is far from obvious. Indeed, this Essay
analyzes the question of the proper scope of class actions by starting at
precisely the opposite point from Professor Redish—from the point of
social welfare rather than individual autonomy. Put differently, this Essay
treats seriously the idea that class actions should be used only when they
advance social welfare. Adopting this “superiority principle” leads the law
of class actions, I will argue, to an endpoint not so very distant from the
point at which Professor Redish arrives.
The Essay proceeds in two parts. First, the Essay analyzes Wholesale
Justice’s argument about the proper scope of class actions, as well as the
difficulties that this argument encounters under the present case law.
Second, the Essay examines the proper reach of class actions if the
superiority of class actions on a social-welfare basis were the touchstone. I
propose a novel principle—which I call the “superiority as unity”
principle—as a workable way to implement a class action built on a socialwelfare foundation. Class actions constructed around a workable
superiority principle, rather than an individual-autonomy principle, would
require a significant restructuring of present American class action law.
Although the restructuring that the superiority as unity principle requires is
not the trimming of class action law that Professor Redish advocates,
surprising convergences emerge from a comparison of the two approaches.

6

See REDISH, supra note 1, at 228–32.
See id. at 137–40.
8
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (noting that due process “generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors”: “the private interest that will be affected”; “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and “the Government’s interest, including . . . the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail”).
7
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I.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, AUTONOMY, AND THE LIMITED
ROLE OF CLASS ACTIONS
Like much of Professor Redish’s work, the starting point for
Wholesale Justice is political and democratic theory. Professor Redish
believes passionately in individual integrity, individual autonomy, the right
of individuals to participate in the democratic process as a means of
protecting their interests, and the necessity of holding government
institutions accountable to legislative and constitutional will. Many people
believe these things, of course. But few have ever analyzed and defended
the legal implications of liberal democratic theory with Professor Redish’s
sophistication and technical virtuosity. Professor Redish’s class action
scholarship is a small corner of this entire body of work, but it stands as a
wonderful synthesis of the ideas that cut across his work in constitutional
law, federal courts, and civil procedure.9
To understand Professor Redish’s concerns with class actions, we can
begin with two basic propositions. First, the class action is a device by
which one person (or a group of people) acts as the representative(s) of a
larger group (or class) with similar claims. Second, in modern American
law, the result achieved by the class representative(s) is binding on the
members of the class as long as the representation is adequate; class
members lose the ability to prosecute or defend the claims in their own
right.10
Given Professor Redish’s intellectual commitments, it is easy to
understand his unease with class actions. Class actions turn the adversarial
system, which strongly protects the autonomy of individual litigants,11 on
its head. Individual members of the class lose the ability to decide whether,
when, where, with whom, and against whom to file suit. They also lose the

9
For examples of Professor Redish’s use of liberal democratic theory, see Martin H. Redish,
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984)
(abstention); Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and the
Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877
(2009) (preclusion); and Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and
Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303 (2009) (First Amendment).
10
See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) (“[T]he judgment in a ‘class’ or ‘representative’
suit, to which some members of the class are parties, may bind members of the class or those
represented who were not made parties to it.”).
11
For the classic defense of the adversarial system, which grounds the system normatively in the
right of individuals to participate in the process by which their rights are determined, see Lon L. Fuller,
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). For other discussions, see
STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATION 33–39 (1988), and Norman W. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of
Adversary System Values, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1377 (2008).
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ability to choose their own lawyers.12 These decisions fall to class
representatives or to class counsel. Although a majority of American class
actions are opt-out class actions13—meaning that class members can in
theory exit the class and protect their interests according to their own
lights—opt-out rates are in fact very low.14 By setting the default rule to
require that class members opt out rather than opt in, even opt-out class
actions intrude significantly on litigant autonomy.
But class actions can pose difficulties beyond formal interference with
an individual’s ability to protect his or her legal rights. One practical
problem is identifying the class members’ interests. Adequate
representation does not require a perfect correspondence between the
interests of class members and those of the class representative; rather,
common questions, typical claims, a lack of conflicting interests, and a
capacity and willingness to represent similar claims are enough.15 Because
class actions are typically composed of hundreds or thousands of members,
neither the class representative nor class counsel is likely to have met most
of them. Thus, it requires an exercise of imagination even to know what the
interests of absent members are. The interests of the class representatives
can be used as proxies for the interests of individual class members, or the
class can be conceived of as an entity with a collective interest different
from the interests of its members.16 But if we begin with a focus on

12

In an adversarial system, the ability to choose counsel is one of the defining aspects of individual
litigation. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 441 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“A fundamental premise of the adversary system is that individuals have the right to retain the attorney
of their choice to represent their interests in judicial proceedings.”); see also id. at 442 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“Everyone must agree that the litigant’s freedom to choose his own lawyer in a civil case is
a fundamental right.”).
13
See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 21 (1996) (stating that 61% of the class actions contained in a study were certified
under Rule 23(b)(3), which permits class members to opt out; 39% were certified under Rules 23(b)(1)
or (b)(2), which do not permit opting out).
14
Id. at 52 (noting that in the study, a median of 0.1% to 0.2% of class members opted out of a
case, and that in 75% of the cases studied, fewer than 100 class members opted out).
15
Commonality, typicality, and adequacy (understood to mean a lack of conflicting interests or
other disabling reasons why a class representative or class counsel cannot protect the interests of class
members) are the touchstones of the constitutional demand for adequate representation. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(a)(2)–(4); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (“The adequacy
inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class
they seek to represent.”); Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982); Hansberry,
311 U.S. 32 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires adequate representation in order for a
class judgment to bind class members). The Court has noted that these specific requirements in Rule
23(a) are designed to determine “whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class
action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated
that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence”; thus,
they “tend to merge” with each other. Gen. Tel. Co., 457 U.S. at 157 n.13.
16
For an excellent treatment of this latter approach, see David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class
as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998).
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individual autonomy, as Professor Redish does, these solutions are
obviously inadequate.17
Class actions can also create incentives that threaten class members’
interests. One problem is that class representatives may use the claims of
class members as bargaining chips to enhance the value of their own
claims, sacrificing the interests of those they represent in the process.18
Similarly, in many negative-value cases,19 neither the class representatives
nor the class members have a large incentive to monitor the work of class
counsel; hence, the lawyers have an opportunity to collude with the
defendant or otherwise to enrich themselves at the expense of the class.20
The frequency with which “sellouts” or collusion occur is debatable. What
is not debatable is that (except for negative-value cases, in which the loss
of class members’ autonomy is functionally nil) the distance between the
individual and class counsel makes the adversarial ideal of vigorous
representation of each individual’s interests difficult to achieve.
The threat that class actions pose to democratic accountability does not
end with the potential undermining of litigant autonomy. In various ways
class actions also affect substantive law. First, class actions have the
potential to skew litigation outcomes in comparison to individual
litigation.21 Second, class actions threaten in some cases to impose massive
“bet the company” liability that may force defendants to settle claims that

17

See REDISH, supra note 1, at 115–20.
For a discussion of how a self-interested class representative or class counsel has an incentive to
use the claims of class members to leverage a greater recovery or fee, see Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking
Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1149–51 (2009).
19
In a negative-value—or large-scale, small-claim—case, the costs of individual litigation for a
plaintiff exceed the value of the claim, essentially making the claim worthless. Class actions, which
aggregate many such claims, can make the case financially worthwhile. See Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1991).
20
For two well-known discussions of this possibility, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877 (1987), and Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1995) (describing “collusion between class counsel
and the defendants” in mass tort class action settlement).
21
That skewing is most evident with negative-value claims, which would remain unfiled absent an
aggregation mechanism. But the skewing effect of aggregating claims has been experimentally
demonstrated in positive-value cases as well. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects
of Outlier Presence, Plaintiff Population Size, and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury
Decisions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209, 225–26 (1988); see also Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S.
Bordens, The Consolidation of Plaintiffs: The Effects of Number of Plaintiffs on Jurors’ Liability
Decisions, Damage Awards, and Cognitive Processing of Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 909, 914,
917 (2000) (reporting experimental data showing that the likelihood of recovery increases as more
plaintiffs are aggregated but that the average damage award decreases if more than four plaintiffs are
aggregated).
18
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lack merit.22 Third, the law created to resolve a class action can be sui
generis; rather than respecting the preexisting allocation of legal rights and
remedies, some courts instead have crafted unique rules for resolving class
actions.23 Fourth, because most members of a class never make a conscious
decision to sue and because the largest potential beneficiary of most class
actions is class counsel, class actions create a situation in which the
delivery of remedial compensation to individuals can become an
afterthought to, rather than the point of, adjudication.24 Fifth, in light of the
failure of individual compensation, class actions act more as regulatory
mechanisms with class counsel serving as private attorneys general. Such
an approach may work at cross purposes with the regulatory stance taken
by the government toward the defendants’ behavior.25
In all these ways, class actions in effect change the substantive law—
not at a formal level but at the practical level of its enforcement. These
changes, brought about by judicial procedure, arguably fail to respect the
role of the legislature or other lawgivers in our democracy.26 This failure is
a particular problem at the federal level because the Rules Enabling Act
delegated to the Supreme Court only the power to promulgate “rules of
practice and procedure”27 that do not “abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.”28 Rule 23, which was adopted pursuant to this directive,
arguably oversteps the boundaries of this congressional delegation, thus
usurping the legislative function to prescribe the rules by which federal
courts adjudicate controversies.29
A final difficulty exists with a particular subset of class actions known
as “settlement class actions.” These cases involve prefiling negotiation and
22

See CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Posner, J.); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.); In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.). But see Valentino v.
Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that this rationale “does not appear to
be in line with the law of this circuit”); In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 460 (D. Wyo. 1995)
(stating that the “bet the company” rationale “is not a legal basis to deny class certification”).
23
See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 152–53, 181–82 (2003).
24
See REDISH, supra note 1, at 24.
25
See id. at 23–24.
26
See id. at 21–56.
27
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
28
Id. § 2072(b).
29
See REDISH, supra note 1, at 16–18; Nagareda, supra note 23, at 154, 189–91. The Court has
noted the tension between Rule 23 and the Rules Enabling Act on three occasions and has consequently,
on each occasion, adopted a reading of Rule 23 that was more constrained. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997). On the other hand, the Court has held that for
purposes of the Erie doctrine, Rule 23 is a procedural rule that passes muster under the Enabling Act.
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) (plurality
opinion).
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settlement of class members’ claims. A lawyer, purporting to act on behalf
of a putative class, strikes a deal with the defendants to resolve the claims
and then files a case asking the court to certify a class and approve the
settlement. Neither the purported class representatives nor the defendants
intend to litigate the case; in effect, the purported class counsel promises to
sell, and the defendants agree to purchase, the right of class members to
sue.30 Both sides come to court seeking a judicial imprimatur on the deal;
they are not adverse to each other. As such, settlement class actions pose a
potential constitutional difficulty: it is not clear that the matter before the
court presents a justiciable case or controversy within the meaning of
Article III of the United States Constitution.31
As I have developed the story until now, class actions seem unsuited
for use in any circumstance. In fact, class actions can also yield significant
benefits. For instance, they are a useful procedural mechanism for
resolving rights held as a group or class—although such group rights are
fairly rare in the modern world.32 They also promise, at least in some cases,
an efficient vehicle for the enforcement of individual rights, an ability to
deter unlawful behavior fully, and a mechanism to equalize litigationinvestment incentives of individual plaintiffs and defendants.33 For
purposes of appreciating Professor Redish’s argument, it is not necessary to
dwell on these advantages at length. The important point is that these
potential benefits set up two procedural choices: whether to allow class
actions at all, and if so, under what constraints.
Professor Redish’s significant contribution to the class action debate
arises from the way in which he answers these questions. The standard
answer toward which most scholars in the debate gravitate balances the
costs against the benefits; although different scholars weigh the costs and
benefits differently (and hence come to different conclusions about the
proper breadth of modern class actions), the methodology is the same:
whether and when to use class actions are policy choices largely
unconstrained by constitutional fetters.34 Professor Redish begins in a
30

See Nagareda, supra note 23, at 159–63.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 612–13 (raising but not deciding
justiciability concerns for settlement class actions).
32
Providing for the enforcement of such rights was the original purpose of class actions and related
representative-litigation devices in English law. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP
LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 39–41 (1987); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An
Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1858–78 (1998)
(discussing the rise of class actions in England).
33
See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants
Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393 (2000).
34
This statement is a bit of a reach. All scholars must acknowledge certain constitutional markers
that limit the scope of class actions. For instance, the requirement of adequate representation is
grounded in the Due Process and the Full Faith and Credit Clauses. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
43 (1940). The requirements that absent class members seeking monetary relief be afforded an
31
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different place: with the Constitution. He argues that settlement class
actions filed in federal court violate the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article III—that they fail to present the requisite adverseness demanded by
the liberal adversary theory that underpins the case-or-controversy
requirement.35
Of far broader significance, however, is Professor Redish’s second
argument: that the autonomy of individuals to make litigation choices—
including the choice whether to bring suit—is a constitutionally protected
right. For years, the Supreme Court has paid occasional homage to the “day
in court” ideal,36 which holds that the Due Process Clause gives each
person the right to present his or her individual claim to a judge or jury.
Pushed to its limit, the day in court ideal also places adversarial process,
under which litigants present proofs and reasoned arguments,37 on a
constitutional foundation. Although the Court has sometimes intimated that
adversarial process enjoys constitutional status,38 the Court and scholars39
have declined to read most aspects of the adversarial system into the Due
Process Clause.40 On the contrary, the Court’s present view about
constitutionally adequate process is decidedly instrumentalist: departures
from adversarial process are permissible when the savings that a
opportunity to opt out and that each class member entitled to opt out be given the best practicable notice
of this right also have their origin in the Due Process Clause. See Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2559;
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 & n.3 (1985); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156, 173 (1974). Given these constitutional markers, however, nearly all scholars treat the exact
circumstances in which class treatment is appropriate as questions of law and policy rather than a
question of constitutional right.
35
See REDISH, supra note 1, at 176–83, 206–27.
36
See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (noting that a court’s inability to bind
nonparties to a prior judgment “is part of our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have
his own day in court’” (quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4449 (1981))).
37
See Fuller, supra note 11, at 363.
38
See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[A] common law
trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding.”); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347
(1943) (Frankfurter, J.) (“The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural
safeguards.”); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the
mode by which it was reached. . . . No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to
give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor
has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that
justice has been done.”); supra note 12.
39
E.g., Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 193 (1992) (discussing the historical limits on the day in court ideal).
40
The arguable exceptions are the related rights of notice and opportunity to be heard. See Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). But such rights are not unique to an
adversarial approach to adjudication. See ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE princs. 5.1–.8 (2004). In any event, Mullane indicates that even these rights are subject to
the balancing of individual and governmental interests. 339 U.S. at 314 (“Against this interest of the
State we must balance the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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nonadversarial procedure realizes exceed the expected costs of erroneous
deprivations that individuals incur as a result of the nonadversarial
procedure.41
Professor Redish tackles this standard wisdom head-on. His argument,
which should prove to be one of the most significant of his many, many
insights on law, begins with American liberal democratic theory. Liberal
democratic theory is ultimately grounded in our country’s “normative
commitment to self-determination and individual rights.”42 Professor
Redish carries over the “autonomy principle”43 at the heart of democratic
theory from the political to the judicial realm. In particular, he argues that,
“[a]t the very least the individual must have autonomy in his efforts to
participate in the processes of government, where democracy operates.”44
The Bill of Rights—especially the First Amendment—and the Fourteenth
Amendment give constitutional force to the autonomy principle,45 and the
“procedural due process guarantee is appropriately viewed as a
constitutional outgrowth of democracy’s normative commitment to such
process-based political autonomy.”46 Elsewhere, Professor Redish argues
that liberal democratic theory leads logically to a “liberal adversary theory”
that entrusts to individuals decisions about how best to protect their
interests and to participate in the judicial aspect of democratic selfgovernance.47
My brief summary of Professor Redish’s argument does not do justice
to its sophistication. But it should be evident that the argument affects the
permissible scope of class actions. The scope of class actions is no longer
simply a matter of policy preference.48 Rather, if litigation autonomy and
adversarial process are of constitutional stature, then class actions face
constitutional difficulties. As mentioned, class actions remove the ability of
individual litigants to decide whether and how to litigate their claims and
instead place these decisions in the hands of surrogates.49 As Professor
Redish points out, it would surely violate the First Amendment if the
government paternalistically forbade people from petitioning the legislative
41

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (discussed supra note 8). For recent
invocations of Mathews v. Eldridge, see Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517–20 (2011), using the
three balancing factors from Mathews to determine that counsel need not be provided to indigent civil
litigants facing jail time for contempt as long as other safeguards to reduce erroneous incarcerations are
in place, and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529–35 (2004), using the Mathews factors to determine
the process due to detainees attempting to challenge their designation as enemy combatants.
42
REDISH, supra note 1, at 136.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 142.
45
Id. at 142–43.
46
Id. at 143.
47
Id. at 197–98.
48
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
49
See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
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or executive branch and instead appointed representatives to do so on their
behalf.50 Is it any less a constitutional offense when a particular government
official—a judge—appoints a class representative and class counsel to
present individuals’ grievances to another branch of government, the
judiciary?51 Likewise, if the First Amendment’s freedoms of expression and
association guarantee a right of nonassociation,52 then how can the
government force class members to associate with each other in a class
action?53
Professor Redish recognizes that cloaking litigant autonomy and
adversarial process in constitutional robes is not the end of the inquiry.
Constitutional rights are not absolute. But the government shoulders a
heavy burden to show “a truly compelling competing interest” when it
deprives individuals of these rights.54 In running the present law of class
certification through the compelling interest analysis, Professor Redish
finds that most, albeit not all, American class actions fall short. At the risk
of reducing nuanced arguments to simplistic bullets, I can synthesize
Professor Redish’s proposals to scale back the breadth of American class
actions as follows55:
•
•
•

Due to Article III justiciability concerns, federal courts should not
certify settlement class actions.
Litigation class actions should be permitted in the (albeit rare)
circumstances in which they were historically available: to
enforce a group’s jointly held legal rights.56
With respect to the more common situation of individually held
claims:
o Mandatory class actions should be allowed only in cases in
which it would be impossible or extraordinarily
burdensome for a defendant to comply simultaneously
with separate orders in two or more cases that putative
class members might bring.57

50

See REDISH, supra note 1, at 135–36, 142–44.
See id. at 136.
52
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977).
53
See REDISH, supra note 1, at 160.
54
Id. at 137; see also Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005) (“Regulations that impose
severe burdens on associational rights must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”).
55
I derive this synthesis from discussions throughout Wholesale Justice, but a nice summary of the
main recommendations can be found in the concluding chapter. See REDISH, supra note 1, at 230–31.
56
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
57
This standard is essentially the same as the standard for mandatory class treatment already in
place in Rule 23(b)(1)(A). See REDISH, supra note 1, at 163–65, 231. What Professor Redish would
eliminate are mandatory class actions in limited-fund cases, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B), and in
cases (other than those encompassed by Rule 23(b)(1)(A)) in which parties seek injunctive or
declaratory relief, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). See generally REDISH, supra note 1, at 165–69
(discussing why mandatory class actions should not be permitted in the (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) situations).
51
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o

o

Opt-out class actions should be allowed only in negativevalue suits in which the size of the claim is so small that
“the constitutional interest in litigant autonomy is de
minimis.”58
Otherwise, only opt-in class actions—class actions in
which putative class members consent to be part of the
class—should be permissible.59

Turning as it does on the related values of democratic theory and
litigant autonomy, Professor Redish’s proposal cogently provides
principled boundaries for the use of class actions. It is brilliant work. It
demonstrates a breadth of vision not often seen in the scholarship on class
actions, which often focuses on more specific aspects of Rule 23. Still, the
proposal is not without a few weaknesses. Let me mention three, very
quickly, as a setup to the following Part.60
First, the connection between democratic theory and litigant autonomy
is not airtight. It may be, as Professor Redish asserts, that the basis of
democracy is the promotion of individual self-determination and autonomy.
But in the end, democracy bends the autonomy of the individual to the will
of the majority. Autonomy is not protected in any absolute sense.
Second, the claim that litigants enjoy a constitutional right to exercise
a high degree of autonomous influence over their claims is debatable. Thus
far, the Supreme Court has never declared that such a right exists, and such
a claim seems suspect, at least in a strong form, in light of the various ways

58

REDISH, supra note 1, at 172. In an exception to this rule, Professor Redish would not permit
negative-value class actions when the amount at stake is so small that putative class members would not
even bother to file a claim. Such suits operate as “bounty hunter” suits that benefit only the lawyers and
are functionally qui tam actions unauthorized by statute. Id. at 131–32.
59
In effect, opt-in class actions (known as “spurious class actions”) were provided for in Rule
23(a)(3) of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated in 1938 and remained available
until the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 changed Rule 23(b)(3) to an opt-out provision. See 7A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1752 (3d ed. 2005). In modern practice,
opt-in class actions are not authorized under Rule 23, and the opt-in process is used only in certain Fair
Labor Standards Act cases known as collective actions. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
60
In addition, although I do not agree with either of them for reasons whose full explication would
distract me from the focus of the Essay, two of Professor Redish’s other critiques of class actions are
not insurmountable. First, the concern that settlement class actions violate the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III, see supra note 35 and accompanying text, is a problem unique to federal
courts and to those state courts with similar constraints on their judiciary. But see MASS. CONST. pt. 2,
ch. 3, art. II (amended 1964 by art. LXXXV) (permitting courts to issue advisory opinions); Charles M.
Carberry, Comment, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 81 n.3
(1975) (listing ten states that allow advisory opinions). Second, the concern that judicially created class
action rules unduly affect the substantive law enacted by the legislature, see supra notes 26–29 and
accompanying text, is readily addressable: a class action rule can be enacted by the legislature, as
indeed some legislatures have done, see, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901–909 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2013).
Here, I examine only Professor Redish’s most sweeping claim—that class actions are, for the most part,
illegitimate in any liberal democracy.
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in which our procedural system constrains individual autonomy.61 Even if
the right exists, it is not clear why those interests are entitled to the highest
level of protection—the strict scrutiny level that requires a compelling
government interest to justify a deprivation. For instance, we all enjoy due
process and equal protection rights against government interference with
our economic interests, but the government can typically overcome these
rights by showing that it has a rational basis for doing so.62 If the same
rational basis review were applied to Rule 23, it would surely pass muster
because the present structure of Rule 23, while perhaps permitting more
class actions than some might wish, is hardly irrational.
Third, and relatedly, the extant test for procedural due process allows
the individual’s interest in adversarial adjudication of claims to be traded
off against society’s interest in more efficient and streamlined forms of
process.63 Professor Redish’s view about the permissible scope of class
actions, which is based on a view of the primacy of litigant autonomy and
adversarial procedure, would require a significant reorientation of the
present, widely shared understanding of the Due Process Clause.
In a sense, all three of these criticisms come to the same point. If we
grant Professor Redish his assumption about the primacy of litigant
autonomy and adversarial process, his conclusions follow naturally.64 But
the assumption is contestable. Many would start from the opposite point:
that the aim of democracy is to give effect to the majority’s will. The fight
in any liberal democracy is then over the dividing point between those
areas in which individual aspiration must bend to the will of the majority
and those areas in which the individual can live free of majoritarian
interference. In this debate over which aspects of human endeavor or
existence should be cabined off from the will of the majority, few people, I
suspect, would place litigant autonomy, adversarial process, or freedom
from becoming class members (in most situations) on the side of those
rights with which a democratically elected government may tinker only in
compelling cases.
Indeed, any theory grounded in autonomy must wrestle with
autonomy’s dark underside: the freedom that autonomous individuals enjoy
to cause harm to others when it is in their self-interest to do so. Wherever
61

To take a simple example, in most circumstances a defendant must assert a compulsory
counterclaim in the lawsuit filed against it by the plaintiff. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). The Federal Rules
deprive a defendant of the autonomy to bring the counterclaim as a separate claim in a forum of its own
choosing.
62
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding a statute regulating
opticians’ practices against due process and equal protection challenges on rational basis review).
63
See supra notes 8, 38–41 and accompanying text.
64
Indeed, given his premises, Professor Redish may be too generous in permitting class actions; a
good argument could be made that to the extent that the guiding principle is individual selfdetermination, opt-out suits should not be permitted even if the value of the claim, and therefore the loss
of autonomy, is de minimis. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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we might draw the line for purely private behavior that harms others, it
seems entirely appropriate to deny individuals the use of social institutions
like courts when the individuals’ actions threaten to inflict avoidable harms
on others or avoidable costs on society. And the impulse that unites the
four types of class actions found in Rules 23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2),
and (b)(3) is the desire to prevent individuals, by means of separate
litigation, from inflicting avoidable harms and costs.65 Far from being an
impermissible affront to litigant autonomy, class actions are an appropriate
response to the harmful effects of unbridled self-interest in litigation.
II. THE “SUPERIORITY AS UNITY” PRINCIPLE
Let me therefore start from the premise Professor Redish rejects: that
class actions should be permitted when they yield the greatest good for the
greatest number.66 Under this approach, the only limit on using class
actions is their capacity to achieve more utility (or less harm) than other
litigation mechanisms. If some other mechanism or combination of
mechanisms can be expected to yield more utility, then a class action may
not be certified. On the other hand, if the class action can be expected to
yield more social benefit, then it may be certified.
“Superiority” is inherently a comparative inquiry: the class action
must be compared to other options that a government has established to
resolve disputes over legal rights. A range of alternatives can exist. One
option for the government is to do nothing and let harm lie where it falls.
Another is direct government intervention, either through regulating
behavior ex ante or pursuing civil or criminal actions ex post. A third is to
allow parties to resolve disputes privately—through arbitration, settlement,
or the like. A fourth is private litigation, with the government, through its
court system, hosting and resolving claims presented to it.
Under the private-litigation option, various suboptions for resolving
wide-scale disputes exist. One is individual litigation, with a separate case
brought by each affected person. Another is group litigation, in which
victims voluntarily join together or courts consolidate their individually
filed cases.67 Yet another is a bellwether process, in which the claims of

65

See Tidmarsh, supra note 18, at 1146–47.
Professor Redish calls this approach the “utilitarian justice model.” REDISH, supra note 1, at 107.
For his critique of the model, see id. at 107–15. This utilitarian principle is not, of course, precisely in
tune with democratic theory: a majority, each with a small interest in a matter, can outvote a minority
whose collective interests are more sizable. But if we hypothesize that some members of the minority
(those with the larger stake) will “bribe” some members of the majority (those with the smaller stake) to
switch their vote, society as a whole will be better off. Cf. THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO LAW 4–6 (2004) (discussing Pareto superiority, Pareto optimality, and potential Pareto
optimality as ways to define social utility).
67
See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1) (allowing plaintiffs to join together when their claims are
transactionally related and they present a common question of law or fact); FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a)
66
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some victims receive a full hearing and the claims of other victims are
determined or settled on the basis of these decisions.68 Any of these
processes may be married to a preclusion process in which (by consent or
judicial fiat) the findings or results attained in early cases bind other
victims. A government may make available some of these suboptions and
not others, and the available suboptions may overlap with each other. The
American litigation system, for example, sets individual litigation as its
default position, but it also offers all of the litigation alternatives—although
it severely constrains the use of the preclusion option.69
To satisfy the principle of superiority, a class action must be capable
of achieving a better outcome than any combination of these options and
suboptions. Determining whether a class action is “better” involves the
familiar cost–benefit calculation: the net benefit (calculated as gross
benefits minus costs) of using a class action must exceed the net benefit of
each alternative or combination of alternatives.
Because this definition of superiority balances expected benefits
against expected costs, understanding what constitutes a “benefit” or a
“cost” of class actions and their alternatives is critical. Benefits and costs
must be calculated on a global basis, not just on the benefits or costs to the
parties.70 Not every class action generates the same benefits or creates the
same costs. A positive-value class action, in which class members’
recoveries are large enough to make individual actions viable, can reduce
one cost component: litigation expenses. On the other hand, a positivevalue class action causes, as a cost, a loss of autonomy for individual class
members who no longer control their claims—a point that Professor Redish
(allowing a court to consolidate cases filed in the same federal district); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)
(2006) (permitting pretrial consolidation of cases filed in different federal districts).
68
See In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1997).
69
For an extended examination of the available mechanisms for aggregating related cases, as well
as their limits, see JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, MODERN COMPLEX LITIGATION 59–340,
1033–88 (2d ed. 2010). On the limits of preclusion by judicial fiat, see Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880
(2008).
70
Except in some settlement class actions, a court makes the decision to certify a class action
before the outcome of the case is known. Hence, in making a determination of superiority, a court must
compare the expected benefit of class and nonclass alternatives. The expected benefit of a class action is
calculated by multiplying the social benefits that the class action will yield (call it L) by the probability
that the action will yield that outcome (call it P), and then subtracting the expected costs of the class
action (call them C); thus, the net social value of a class action is determined by the formula
(P × L) – C. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.4, at 598 (7th ed. 2007)
(“[T]he plaintiff’s net expected gain from litigating is the judgment if he wins discounted by his
estimate of the probability that he will win, minus his litigation costs.”); Steven Shavell, Suit,
Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal
Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 57 (1982) (discussing how risk-neutral parties make valuations based on
expected value, “discounting possible outcomes by their probabilities”). The expected net benefit for
each nonclass alternative is calculated in a similar fashion, although the probability term (P) must
include not only the likelihood of an alternative yielding a benefit but also the likelihood that an
individual or group will pursue that alternative.
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has made eloquently.71 Conversely, a negative-value class action, which
creates a lawsuit where otherwise there would be none, invariably increases
litigation expenses, but also achieves as a benefit the deterrence of illegal
behavior.
The same is true with respect to calculating the benefits and costs of
alternatives to class actions. For instance, individual litigation may impose
no loss of autonomy but may yield less deterrence than a class action.72 The
same benefit-and-cost vectors—the degree of deterrence and compensation
that each alternative or combination of alternatives achieves, the
alternatives’ ability to ensure similar treatment for similarly situated class
members, their cost to implement, their fit with concerns for autonomy and
democratic accountability, and so on—apply to any alternative to class
actions.
This definition of superiority contains corollaries and limitations. Let
me highlight two of particular significance.73 First, a court system may
possess a patchwork of responses to wide-scale harm—perhaps some
before-the-harm regulation, some after-the-fact individual litigation, some
enforcement of parties’ agreements to arbitrate disputes that arise, and so
on. To be superior, a class action must not be just an improvement over any
single legal strategy, but must also yield a benefit in relation to the sum
total of nonclass responses that we can expect interested players to assay.
Second, to be superior, the class action does not need to yield a greater net
benefit for each member of the class than an alternative strategy, it does not
need to include every victim of wrongdoing, and it does not need to yield a
greater net benefit than other potential class actions that could have been
brought. Superiority compares only the aggregate expected net benefits
achieved through a proposed class action and through nonclass
alternatives.74

71

See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
73
Other corollaries, of less significance to the present discussion, include: (1) the requirement that
that court has the ability to reevaluate its initial determination on class certification based on new
information; (2) a class action must yield a positive expected benefit for class members (P × L > C);
(3) in making the superiority calculus, a court should consider surgical uses of class actions in
combination with other nonclass methods; and (4) in determining the superiority of a class action, a
judge may not reevaluate utility calculations entrusted to other actors in the legal or political process
(e.g., the judge may not decide that the statute on which the class claim is based is bad social policy and
refuse to certify a class on that basis). I thank Mike Dorf for this last refinement.
74
I do not suggest that concerns for fair treatment of individuals within the class or for optimal
class size are insignificant issues—only that they cannot be addressed through the idea of certifying
class actions that are superior to nonclass alternatives. For discussions of how these other principles
might be structured, see David Betson & Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and
“Indivisible” Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542 (2011), providing an economic account of the
optimal size of a class action, and Tidmarsh, supra note 18, at 1175–89, proposing an adequacy-ofrepresentation principle to protect individual class members.
72
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The superiority principle fits neatly into the present calculus for
procedural due process: permit departures from the adversarial ideal when
the gains from the departure exceed the costs.75 In one sense, demanding
superior performance from a class action is hardly a radical notion. The
idea that class actions exist to provide a better way to avoid injustices that a
multiplicity of suits can create dates back centuries.76 The superiority
principle also fits within the general structure of the present Rule 23;
superiority is one of two explicit elements in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions,77
and the superiority (indeed, even the necessity) of class actions in
comparison to nonclass methods of adjudication is the idea that underlies
the mandatory class actions of Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2). Indeed, in some
states a class action’s superior capacity to fairly and efficiently adjudicate a
dispute is the singular touchstone (aside from such foundational matters as
numerosity, commonality, and adequacy of representation) for class
certification.78
At the same time, insisting that the class action be superior in fact is a
very radical notion. Federal courts often duck the superiority analysis
demanded by Rule 23(b)(3), instead applying four factors that Rule
23(b)(3) suggests as guides for resolving predominance and superiority
issues. Most of these factors are so vague that they can be manipulated to
cut either for or against class treatment.79 Of the four factors, the fourth—
75

See supra notes 8, 38–41, 63 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 854, at 148–49
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1836).
77
Class certification can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(3) if “the court finds . . . a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(b)(3). The other element is “predominance”: the “questions of law or fact common to class
members” must “predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Id. As will
become clear in the following discussion, I do not believe that predominance (as understood in the
present Rule 23) is an essential feature of a utility-based class action rule, although some aspects of the
present predominance inquiry are certainly relevant to the proper working of a utility-based class action
rule. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
78
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(a)(5) (McKinney 2006) (permitting a class to be certified if, in
addition to meeting the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, the “class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy”);
see also id. 902(1)–(5) (listing additional factors for a court to consider in deciding whether to certify a
class action). Michigan has a comparable structure, albeit with slightly different factors used to
determine superiority. See MICH. COURT RULE 3.501. In North Carolina, superiority is similarly “[t]he
overriding factor which courts . . . impose prior to the certification of a class.” See THE LAW OF CLASS
ACTION, supra note 2, at 429. The Model Class Actions Rule imposes, in addition to numerosity,
commonality, and adequacy requirements, only the requirement that the class action must aid “the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” MODEL CLASS ACTIONS [ACT] [RULE] § 2(b)(2), 12
U.L.A. 98 (2008); see also id. § 3, 12 U.L.A. 99–100 (providing additional criteria to assist the court in
determining whether a class action advances “the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy”).
North Dakota is one state that has adopted the Model Class Actions Rule. See N.D. R. CIV. P. 23.
79
The four factors are “the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions”; “the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
begun by or against class members”; “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
76
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manageability—has become the most important, but this factor switches
the question from whether a class action is the best mechanism to whether
it is not a disaster to manage.80
Some courts eschew the four factors and address superiority head-on.
But these courts have tended to give meaning to superiority through cutand-dried rules. For instance, a class action that applies multiple
substantive laws is not superior, nor is a class action that aggregates
positive-value claims.81 Such rules can frustrate certification of class
actions that are superior to their alternatives.
Courts’ desire for clear rules is, however, understandable. One of the
telling criticisms of the Mathews v. Eldridge approach to procedural due
process, which balances the costs of additional process against the gains in
accuracy that the additional process is expected to generate, is its
indeterminacy.82 In the administrative law context that gave rise to the
balancing approach, it has proven difficult to value accurately any of the
three components of the balance: the probability of an erroneous
deprivation, the cost of the erroneous deprivation, or the savings to the
government from nonadversarial procedure.83 Moved to the law of class

the claims in the particular forum”; and “the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D). Rule 23(b)(3) does not say how much weight is to be given to any factor, nor how
they cut. For instance, the existence of other litigation could be seen as a reason to certify a class (to
avoid the transaction costs of repetitive litigation) or as a reason not to certify a class (to vindicate the
autonomy of litigants to bring their own suits).
80
See Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1304−07 (9th Cir. 1990)
(upholding certification after examining only issues of manageability); see also Newton v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 191 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that a class action must
be the “best” method for resolving the dispute but in fact analyzing superiority almost exclusively in
terms of the class action’s manageability); Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 474, 491
(E.D. Cal. 2006) (“Whether a case is manageable as a class action can be an overriding consideration in
determining superiority.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see In re Visa Check/MasterMoney
Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the “failure to certify an action under
Rule 23(b)(3) on the sole ground that it would be unmanageable is disfavored”), overruled in part by In
re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006). Nebraska’s class action rule also relies
heavily on manageability. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (2008); Kosowski v. City Betterment Corp.,
249 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Neb. 1977) (denying class certification in part because of the difficulty and
impracticability of distributing a remedy to class members); THE LAW OF CLASS ACTION, supra note 2,
at 371 (“A class action [in Nebraska] must be manageable or [certification] will be denied.”).
81
See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746–51 (5th Cir. 1996). For other cut-anddried rules that act as a surrogate for superiority, see supra note 22 and accompanying text, discussing
the bet-the-company (or overdeterrence) argument, and infra note 98, discussing the immaturity-oflitigation argument.
82
See supra note 8; see also Robert G. Bone, The Story of Connecticut v. Doehr: Balancing Costs
and Benefits in Defining Procedural Rights, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 159, 186 (Kevin M.
Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (“The Mathews balancing test is far too open-ended to generate precise
results.”).
83
See Margaret G. Farrell, Doing unto Others: A Proposal for Participatory Justice in Social
Security’s Representative Payment Program, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 883, 924–29 (1992); Jerry L.

582

107:565 (2013)

Superiority as Unity

actions, this problem of correctly weighing benefits and costs becomes
impossible in practice due to informational and valuation difficulties.
Courts lack the information necessary to assess accurately the likelihoods,
amounts, and costs of recovery for all putative class members across all of
the potential class and nonclass aggregation scenarios that enter into the
superiority principle’s calculus. To compound this difficulty, some of the
variables in the calculus—such as democratic accountability and autonomy,
to name just two—lack ready markets, so that courts must compare
monetizable apples to nonmonetizable oranges in the valuation process.
Therefore, although clear rules are useful, they must hew more closely
to the actual costs and benefits of class actions and their alternatives than
the present Rule 23(b)(3) guidelines do. Furthermore, because the idea of
superiority is not limited only to Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, these rules
must also address whether class actions are superior in the circumstances
presently handled by (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions. In creating a way of
reducing the superiority principle to a set of clear principles that balance
the benefits and costs of class actions better than other “superiority
surrogates” presently on offer, I begin with the historical reach of class
actions. Until modern times, class actions were allowed only when class
members had a joint interest in suing or being sued.84 This joint interest ran
along three dimensions: a unity of legally relevant facts among all class
members, a unity of the legal theories asserted by (or against) all class
members, and a unity of the remedy sought by (or against) all class
members. Whatever differences in interest that class members may
otherwise have had with respect to their desire to prosecute (or defend) the
lawsuit, the legally relevant facts, the legal theories, and the remedies were
identical for all.
If class members are united across all three of these dimensions of a
claim, the superiority of a class action is evident. The right or liability of
one is truly the right or liability of all. It makes no sense for each individual
to sue (or be sued), clogging courts with matters identical to matters
previously determined or contemporaneously being determined elsewhere.
But requiring an identity across all three elements of a claim is also
highly restrictive; unlike in the Middle Ages, when the rights of individuals
were often bound up with the rights of groups to which they belonged,85
few such claims exist in the modern legal world.86 Thus, limiting class
Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 37–46 (1976).
84
See supra notes 32, 56 and accompanying text.
85
See SUSAN REYNOLDS, KINGDOMS AND COMMUNITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, 900–1300, at 1 (1st
ed. 1984) (arguing that collective activity “was more important and more pervasive in medieval
Europe” than previously recognized); YEAZELL, supra note 32, at 41–71 (applying this insight to the
law of collective litigation in medieval England).
86
The closest analogue in frequent use might be the shareholder derivative suit, in which each
owner (shareholder) of the corporation can, within limits, assert claims that belong to the corporation.
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actions only to cases involving a unity of facts, law, and remedy would
leave out other cases in which class actions could be a superior means of
resolving disputes. On the other hand, if class members enjoy an identity
along none of these dimensions, it becomes more difficult to see how a
class action is superior; the claims by or against class members diverge to a
degree at each relevant aspect (the facts determining liability, the legal
theory or theories of recovery, and the quantum of remedy obtainable),
making an efficient resolution of the class action harder to achieve and
raising concerns that the class representative(s) will not fairly and
adequately protect all members of the class.
The solution is to create a presumption that all class members must
possess a unity of interest along one of the three elements of a claim (facts,
law, or remedy) and a substantial overlap of interest along the other two
elements.87 This superiority as unity principle requires three steps. First, a
court must find that (1) the claim of every member of the class involves
exactly the same facts regarding liability, including the facts relevant to any
defenses that might be raised against class members; (2) the claim of every
member of the class invokes exactly the same legal theories; or (3) if
successful, the claim of every class member will result in precisely the
same remedy for each person. Without that unity of interest along one of
those three dimensions, a class action may not be certified. Second, a court
must determine that there is substantial overlap among the claims of class
members on the other two dimensions. “Substantial overlap” requires, in
Rule 23 parlance, that there be commonality among the class members’
claims and that the claims of the class representative(s) be typical of those
of the remaining class members.88

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (providing for derivative suits when a corporation or association fails to
enforce its rights); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.2 (providing for suits by or against members of
unincorporated associations). But even here, the rights of the corporation are distinct from the rights of
the individuals who own shares in the corporation.
87
To this point, I have tried to use neutral language to hold open the possibility of either plaintiff
class actions or defendant class actions. Most class actions involve plaintiff classes. See WILLGING ET
AL., supra note 13, at 41 (reporting data showing that “defendant classes are not common”). For ease of
grammatical expression, I henceforth describe only how the superiority as unity principle for which I
advocate applies to plaintiff class actions. But the same idea can be applied equally to defendant class
actions.
88
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (commonality), (3) (typicality); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–57 (2011) (discussing the commonality requirement); Gen. Tel. Co. of
the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155–60 (1982) (discussing the commonality and typicality
requirements as well as their interrelationship). In addition, the class representative and class counsel
must adequately represent the class. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (adequacy of the class representative),
(g) (adequacy of the class counsel); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940); see also Tidmarsh,
supra note 18, at 1175–77 (proposing a single “do no harm” principle to determine the adequacy of the
class representative and class counsel). One of the advantages of the superiority as unity principle is that
by insisting on a unity of interest along the facts, the law, or the remedy sought, it reduces the number
of ways in which the interests of class representatives, class counsel, and class members can diverge.
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These first two steps create a presumption for or against class
certification. The third step allows the party negatively affected by the
presumption to rebut it. Thus, if superiority and substantial overlap have
been shown, the burden shifts to the defendant to identify specific
procedural mechanisms (or a combination of mechanisms) that would
result in greater net social benefit than the class action; unless the
defendant makes such a showing, the class must be certified. Conversely, if
no unity is shown along any dimension of the case, or if substantial overlap
does not exist along one of the other two dimensions, the burden shifts to
the class representative to show that the class action is still superior to any
other method for resolving the dispute.89 The threshold to rebut the
presumption generated by the first two steps should be high; an aggrieved
defendant must identify clearly and specifically a nonclass alternative that
is superior or an aggrieved plaintiff must identify why all such alternatives
are inferior.
Examples of situations in which there is a unity of liability-relevant
facts are a commercial-airliner crash or a Truth in Lending Act claim in
which the credit card company engaged in the same conduct for each credit
card holder.90 In such cases, the fact that different laws might apply to
judge the class members’ recovery or that class members might be entitled
to different amounts by way of recovery should not automatically bar class
certification—unless the differences in law or remedy are substantial or the
defendant can prove that a specific alternative to class treatment will lead
to a greater net social benefit.
Unity in legal theory is tricky. People with very different factual
claims—for example, all patients in a state injured by doctors’
malpractice—are united in the law they wish applied to their cases,91 but it
is evident that a class action of all medical malpractice victims is not a
superior way to resolve the claims. In such situations, tight control over the
substantial overlap requirement becomes a critical control on the overuse of
class actions.
89

With regard to overcoming this presumption, the superiority surrogates already used by some
courts, see supra note 81 and accompanying text, could still function.
90
It is possible to spin out hypotheticals that would destroy the necessary unity in such examples.
For instance, in the airplane crash, one passenger may be a vacationing airline pilot who saw and was
aware of some defect in the plane before takeoff but chose to encounter the risk anyway. The factual
issues regarding the pilot-passenger’s comparative negligence negate the factual unity required. Thus,
the class representative would need to demonstrate that the class involved a unity of interest along
another dimension of the case (which seems unlikely because the pilot-passenger’s case would involve
comparative negligence law inapplicable to other class members and because the remedy each
passenger would receive is different) or would need to overcome the presumption of noncertification
(which seems possible if only one victim presented a different factual scenario). Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23
advisory committee’s note (1966) (noting that Rule 23(b)(3) is not “ordinarily” suited to the resolution
of mass torts).
91
I assume that none of the patients have peculiar defenses that involve the application of
additional or different law to their cases.
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Unity in remedy keys into the existing structure of Rule 23(b) to an
extent but also operates somewhat differently. When every class member is
entitled to exactly the same remedy if the suit is successful, unity exists.
The classic example is class-wide injunctive relief, in which the defendant
is required to engage in the same conduct with respect to each class
member. Such relief already is the basis for class certification under Rule
23(b)(2). What unity in remedy also opens up is class certification in cases
for identical monetary damage, such as cases involving statutory penalties
in which no class member has a claim in excess of the statutory minimum.92
On the other hand, a class seeking both a class-wide injunction and
individualized monetary recovery does not meet the unity requirement.93
Again, such unity is not itself sufficient to obtain class certification;
substantial factual and legal overlap must also exist, and no nonclass
alternative can lead to the same or better expected outcome at a lesser
cost.94
This superiority as unity principle does not automatically deny class
certification to multistate class actions,95 nor does it reject class actions
simply because class members are entitled to different amounts of
remedy.96 The presence of these factors does, however, affect the likelihood
of class certification because their presence requires a putative class
representative to find a unity of interest elsewhere. The principle also does
not bar consideration of broad social policies, such as underdeterrence if a
class is not certified,97 overdeterrence98 or losses of autonomy or democratic
92
See Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 413–14 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (rejecting
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) when 130,000 class members were each entitled to the statutory
penalty of $100).
93
See Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–61 (2011) (not permitting class members to seek
individualized damage recovery under the aegis of a (b)(2) class action seeking injunctive relief for the
class). Such a class action would either need to find unity along another dimension of the case (the
liability-relevant facts or the law), or the class representative could bring a class action only for
injunctive relief. See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 873 (1984) (holding
that the preclusive effect of a class action does not extend to individual claims of class members). But
see McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 283 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the failure to include
monetary claims of individual class members rendered the class representatives inadequate); Bowden v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 247 S.W.3d 690, 697 (Tex. 2008) (holding that the preclusive effect of a class
action extends to all claims of class members that arose from the same transaction or subject matter).
94
It is of course possible that unity might exist along two dimensions of a case. For instance, in a
statutory-penalty case, the same law and the same remedy might apply to each class member. In such
cases, substantial overlap must still exist for the third dimension.
95
See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741–44 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying class
certification in part because variations in state law defeated Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement).
96
See Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that the
award of individual damages in a small-stakes consumer class action did not defeat the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)).
97
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
98
See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 168 (3d Cir. 2001); Castano, 84 F.3d at 747.
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accountability99 if the class is certified, or the absence of a track record of
prior trials.100 But such arguments are not trump cards that automatically
gain or defeat class certification in the way that courts sometimes employ
them. Instead, they enter into the debate at the third stage of the analysis,
after a court has determined whether or not unity and substantial overlap
exist, as potential trump on the presumption to certify (or not certify) a
class action on the peculiar facts of a given case.101
Even though treating superiority seriously, as the superiority as unity
concept does, reworks the law of class actions significantly, it is not likely
to expand the scope of present class action law. The reason is the
requirement of unity with respect to the liability-related facts, legal theory,
or remedy. Unity—in other words, an identity of facts, law, or remedy for
each and every class member—is difficult to demonstrate. But it is also
almost always necessary if class treatment is to be deemed superior.
Without unity along at least one dimension of a case, the aggregation of
individuals is too ragged and too lacking in cohesion to justify legal
recognition as a group capable of uniting together and being bound by the
result achieved in a single courtroom. Unity also keeps alive the prospect
that an entire aspect of the case (and perhaps the entire case itself) can be
resolved in one fell swoop.
I could say more about the superiority as unity principle, but I have
said enough to outline its shape and operation. Let me briefly compare this
approach to the autonomy-centered approach of Professor Redish.102 It is
not surprising that a class action rule built on a foundation of individual
autonomy will look different from a class action rule built on a foundation
of social welfare. For instance, a superiority as unity approach would not
automatically reject the possibility of settlement class actions, although the
lack of any unity in facts, law, or remedy103 would certainly require the
rejection of class treatment for settlement class actions such as those

99

See supra notes 42–53 and accompanying text.
See Castano, 84 F.3d at 747 (noting concerns with certifying class actions without a track
record of prior trials).
101
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
102
See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
103
The superiority as unity principle would require that the unity of interest involved precede the
settlement. Thus, the fact that a settlement required an identical payment of, say, $10 to every class
member would not create a unity of interest on the remedy if, without the settlement, each class member
were entitled to different amounts. Cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997)
(noting that a common interest in a fair settlement could not create the commonality necessary to satisfy
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance element).
100
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presented in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor104 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp.105
On the other hand, both Professor Redish and I agree that class actions
should be permitted to vindicate jointly held rights106—although the rarity
of such class actions does not create that much common ground. Beyond
that obvious convergence lie other areas of agreement. First, I think it
unlikely that most mass tort claims are susceptible to class treatment under
a superiority as unity principle—not because they are positive-value
claims, as Professor Redish holds,107 but because they are unlikely to
involve a unity of facts, law, or remedy (especially in light of individual
defenses). Second, negative-value suits are likely to result in class
certification—not because the loss of autonomy is de minimis, as Professor
Redish holds,108 but because such claims often involve a single consumer
statute or a single course of conduct toward a mass of consumers sufficient
to establish the requisite unity of law or liability-relevant facts. But
“negative value” should not operate as a substitute for unity. The requisite
identity of interest might be missing in some negative-value class actions,
necessitating the trimming of some broad consumer class actions and the
prima facie refusal to certify others.109 I do not regard this outcome as
undesirable, for despite some occasional loose judicial language to the
contrary,110 negative-value status is not a talisman for class certification.
Third, Professor Redish generally accepts the idea that suits seeking a
class-wide injunction and suits seeking damages should be treated on the
same plane; the disparate treatment of injunctive claims, limited-fund
monetary claims, and ordinary monetary claims is not defensible.111 The
same is true of the superiority as unity principle; whether each class
member is entitled to identical relief, rather than the injunctive or monetary
form of that relief, is a key to class treatment.112
But that similarity hides a more fundamental disagreement in the two
positions. For Professor Redish, the lack of special treatment for limited104
Id. at 624 (describing the factual, legal, and remedial differences among class members who
were exposed to different asbestos products at different times and had not all yet suffered injury and
further noting that the class action was “sprawling”).
105
527 U.S. 815, 854–57 (1999) (describing the variance among class members with respect to
their factual, legal, and remedial positions).
106
See supra notes 56, 84–86 and accompanying text.
107
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
108
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
109
A court may still find that, without class certification, the underdeterrence of the defendant is so
great that the presumption of nonclass treatment due to lack of unity should be overcome. See supra
note 89 and accompanying text.
110
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
111
See REDISH, supra note 1, at 129–30.
112
See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
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fund monetary claims and injunctive claims means that class suits seeking
such relief can no longer be certified as mandatory under, respectively,
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and Rule 23(b)(2). Indeed, except in the context of
negative-value class actions, Professor Redish would require that such class
actions be opt-in.113 The superiority as unity principle is more agnostic
about mandatory and opt-out class actions. If opt-out rights are allowed,
then the superiority calculus will need to be performed again after the optout period in order to determine whether the loss of some class members
affects the unity or substantial-overlap determination; but opt-outs are
unlikely to effect a change in the court’s initial certification decision.114 For
reasons that lie beyond the present discussion, I favor mandatory class
actions if a court can construct a class action of optimal size.115 Be that as it
may, the superiority as unity principle does not support opt-in (as opposed
to opt-out or mandatory) class actions when social utility can be advanced
by the collectivization of related claims.
There are some other trivial differences in the operation of Professor
Redish’s approach and the superiority as unity principle. One is the fate of
the exceedingly rare Rule 23(b)(1)(A) claims, in which separate suits by
individual class members create a possibility that a defendant will be
whipsawed due to an inability to comply with the demands of each suit.
Professor Redish would authorize such class action suits.116 The superiority
as unity principle does not accord favored status to these class actions,
which must meet the usual requirements of unity and substantial overlap.
Indeed, the superiority as unity principle looks on such cases somewhat
askance. The differing remedies potentially sought against the defendant in
these cases make it impossible to show a unity of remedy—or even
substantial overlap on the issue of remedy. But hostility toward such
(b)(1)(A) class actions seems entirely appropriate. Despite the sympathy
we might feel for a whipsawed defendant, it is difficult to imagine how a
113

See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
Under a pure superiority principle, in which class actions are certified only when their net social
gains exceed those of all other litigation forms, see supra notes 66–74 and accompanying text,
superiority would need to be recalibrated after the opt-out period. One of the advantages of thinking
about superiority in terms of unity of interest along at least one litigation dimension is that opt-outs are
unlikely to affect that unity or to reduce the substantial overlap among those class members who remain
in the class. Thus, no recalibration is likely to be needed. In any event, data reveal that the rate of optouts is low. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 13, at 52–54. In addition, opt-out behavior may occur for
strategic-holdout reasons that a class action rule should discourage. See JAY TIDMARSH, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES 39 (1998) (noting that two sets of
opt-outs subsequently settled their claims for multiples of the amounts awarded to class members).
115
For a discussion of this “optimality” principle and the reasons why it should deny opt-out rights
to class members, see Betson & Tidmarsh, supra note 74. Like the superiority as unity principle, the
optimality principle is distinct from, albeit an outgrowth of, the superiority principle. Adoption of the
superiority as unity principle does not require adoption of the “optimality” principle or its denial of optout rights to class members.
116
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
114
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class representative could adequately represent the interests of class
members “who are free alternatively either to assert rights or to challenge
them”117 by yanking the whipsaw one way or another. One of the great
puzzles of the present Rule 23 is how (b)(1)(A) class actions can survive
against an adequacy challenge.118
A second, related difference is the fate of limited-fund class actions.
Professor Redish argues that such actions should not result in mandatory
treatment; indeed, unless they are of the negative-value, opt-out variety, it
seems that such class actions may be conducted only on an opt-in basis.119
The superiority as unity principle is not as categorical, but again, the
demand of each putative class member to a larger share of the pie makes it
difficult to see how such class actions would routinely pass adequacy-ofrepresentation muster.120
Given the different starting points, differences at the endpoint—both
large and small—are unsurprising. More surprising are the places of
agreement. Perhaps future thinking about class actions should be shaped
around those areas on which both theories can agree.121 In any event, the
convergences, as well as the remaining differences, highlight how far the
present Rule 23 lies from any consistent theory of class actions. The great
gift of Wholesale Justice is to remind rulemakers to attend to these first
principles—whether grounded in democratic theory and individual
autonomy, as Professor Redish has argued, or in social utility, as I have
argued—in thinking about the shape of a class action rule.
CONCLUSION
The highest achievement for any scholar is to produce work that
influences the ideas of others. Despite the occasional claim that a particular
article or book is “definitive,” the truth is that no scholar’s work
117

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940).
Indeed, the formulation used in Rule 23(b)(1)(A) was not a part of either the traditional
understanding of the circumstances in which class actions were appropriate, see Hazard et al., supra
note 32, at 1876–78, or in the 1938 version of Rule 23, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938). For a discussion
of the adequacy-of-representation issue, as well as the limited circumstances in which such a class
action might satisfy adequacy-of-representation concerns properly understood, see Tidmarsh, supra
note 18, at 1164–67, 1175–89.
119
One concern in such class actions is the adequacy of representation, given that the class
representative and class members are all competing for a share of a limited pie. See Tidmarsh, supra
note 18, at 1159–64. Such class actions raise a host of other concerns, including their potential
preemption by the Bankruptcy Code. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 838–41 (1999)
(prescribing the general limits of (b)(1)(B) class actions); id. at 843 (noting the tension between a broad
use of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) in mass tort cases and the Bankruptcy Code).
120
See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
121
Cf. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 87–113 (2009) (arguing that disagreements over
comprehensive moral theories should not prevent people from undertaking those actions on which
different theories agree, even if they disagree on the reasons for those actions or on the appropriateness
of other actions).
118
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definitively ends debates, for we will never arrive at the definitive endpoint
of knowledge. Instead, a scholar’s best work opens up and moves debates
forward on the scholar’s terms.
Marty Redish is one of the greatest legal scholars of this, or any, time.
His work has enormous influence. I know—in part because of the
enormous influence his work has had on me. When I was just entering the
academy twenty-some years ago, his newly revised collection of essays on
federal court jurisdiction122 was the single most significant work I read. I
did not, and do not, agree with everything in that book. But I have kept its
ideas close as I have thought about my own solutions to problems in the
law of federal courts and procedure.
For the past several years, I have been thinking about the law of class
actions and trying to find a set of principles that, taken as a whole, can
serve as the foundation for a sensible class action rule. In this Essay, I
debuted in abbreviated form the newest part of my thought process: the
superiority as unity principle. As I have been thinking about this project, it
was fitting that Marty Redish was already there—again lighting my way
with the essays collected in Wholesale Justice, again forcing me to grapple
with his ideas. Wholesale Justice is not only a wonderful synthesis of the
concerns for liberal democratic theory and individual autonomy that
animate all of Professor Redish’s work, but it is also one of the most
important works on class actions in years. I share Professor Redish’s
concerns about the breadth of modern class action law, as well as his desire
to vindicate the individual autonomy on which American democracy
depends. I come out in a different place from Professor Redish regarding
how best to allay these concerns and to give proper effect to individual
autonomy in a mass-injury society. But my disagreement is a small matter
in comparison to Professor Redish’s singular achievement in keeping these
issues front and center in the class action debate. My debt to him is
overwhelming.
For now, let me repay a small part of that debt with words of gratitude
that I intend as my highest possible praise for Marty’s intellectual
guidance: Marty Redish is a true scholar.

122

MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER (2d ed. 1990).
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